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In early part of the 2000s Sri Lanka moved into a stage of cease-fire and peace negotiations, after almost twenty 
years of open civil war. The war, which resulted in an enormous destruction of human and material capital, has 
been largely concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, even though the resultant insecurity has 
spilled over to the other parts of the country, even the capital city of Colombo. This paper gives an account of the 
peace initiative in one of the eastern districts of Sri Lanka, Trincomalee. The complex ethno-religious character of 
Trincomalee has been the cause of heavy fighting in the district. One important issue that has to be addressed in 
post conflict Trincomalee peace-building process is how to balance the various ethno-religious demands, including 
the interests of its Muslim communities. Another difficulty is to settle the dilemma of the internally displaced 
persons. In conclusion this paper argues that there is a strong correlation between peace and development. After 
all, it is rather the rule than the exception that a conflict may return to the stage of an open confrontation if the 
basic disagreements are not handled carefully in the process of peace negotiations. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Since 1983, Sri Lanka has been embroiled in a civil war between the Government and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The political differences between the 
majority Sinhala and minority Tamil population had grown into an open military 
conflict at that time. The escalation of hostilities was based in a perception of 
discrimination among the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. A major demand of the 
LTTE was a separate ‘Eelam’ or state for the Tamil people within the country. After a 
bitter armed struggle that lasted close to two decades, peace negotiations between the 
Government and the LTTE were initiated early 2002 and the country is now slowly 
moving towards achieving  stability. Direct talks, however, have been stalled for the 
time being due to a change of government in Sri Lanka after a recent parliamentary 
election. Hurdles such as these indicate the pitfalls inherent in the delicate negotiation 
process in Sri Lanka. Too often, peace follows upon a compromise that does not fulfil 
the original objectives of any of the warring parties. Therefore, the stage of post 
conflict in Sri Lanka has to be handled with the utmost care, and a new process of 
national development has to be initiated to avoid a feeling among the combatants that 
they have been compromised.  
 
   This paper reports on the Sri Lankan district of Trincomalee in the 
eastern province as an area that is moving towards a situation of stability at present. 
As will be seen, the socio-economic conditions in this district have been affected 
severely by the wartime activities. An intensive reconstruction process has to be 
undertaken here if Trincomalee has to catch up with national development trends. If 
this does not happen, the prevailing exclusion or structural violence can eventually 
result in new periods of open violence. After all, it is rather the rule than the exception 
Late Dr. Anders Narman was Associate Professor at the Department of Human and Economic Development, 
Goteberg University, Sweden. Email: Narman@Geography.su.se. Dr. Upali Vidanapathirana is Senior Lecturer & 
Associate Dean of the Faculty of Social Studies at Open University, Sri Lanka. Email: upali1951@hotmai.com. 
Anders Narman & Upali Vidanapathirana, Transiting from Prolonged Conflict to Post Conflict 
Development 
 
that a conflict may return to the stage of an open confrontation if the basic 
disagreements are not handled carefully in the process of peace negotiations. 
 
   One of the difficulties in an analysis of a post conflict region such as 
Trincomalee is that there is only a limited set of data available. Due to the prevailing 
human insecurity, the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka have not been included 
in any kind of socio-economic surveys or censuses in recent years. Therefore, they 
have been left out of the comparative analysis on economic and social well being on a 
national scale. Government statistics, when included in national reports, have almost 
always been built on rough estimations for eastern and northern provinces of Sri 
Lanka, which is the Tamil heartland in Sri Lanka. The underlying assumption, though, 
is that this region is worse off than other parts of the country, not least as a result of 
the fierce civil war since the early nineteen-eighties. From this follows that national 
statistics on human development in Sri Lanka may not realistically reflect the extreme 
poverty that exists in different parts of the island country.  
 
 Towards the end of 2001, serious talks were initiated to prepare for a 
lasting peace in Sri Lanka. What followed was a prolonged process of discussions on 
possible solutions often interrupted by various incidences of violence. At the same 
time external monitors, in most cases from Norway, kept an eye on what was 
happening, while the aid community promised to assist in the re-building of war torn 
areas. These peace negotiations can only form the first possible phase in a 
complicated process towards reconciliation and development. Experience has shown 
that in one-third of the cases where reconciliation is achieved, lasting peace has often 
been elusive, as one or both parties have not respected promises made in the peace 
agreement.   
 
In this paper, we will first give a short account of the relationship 
between development and peace, which will be followed by a general discussion on 
the civil war in Sri Lanka. This will form a background to the analysis of Trincomalee 
district based on available statistics, newspaper articles, academic journals and books. 
Finally, we will discuss the potentials for a post conflict development scenario in 
Trincomalee district in Sri Lanka.  
 
 
PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: SOME ISSUES 
 
As pointed out by Hettne (2002) peace and development are two sides of the same 
coin. Violent conflicts create a state of turbulence in the environment and in 
particular, in the minds of people, which retards the process of economic as well as 
social development.  Similarly, violent confrontation often leads to a destruction of 
physical and social infrastructure including roads, electricity, schools and hospitals. 
Conflict areas, therefore, may be cut off from most of the development initiatives of 
the state and the private sector. This process invariably leads to a state of real and 
supposed exclusion among peoples and regions that can create a fertile breeding 
ground for protracted frustrations. A real or perceived exclusion can also be expressed 
as a state of structural violence, which in turn can be the reason for direct or open 
violence. Consequently, if the root causes of a civil war are not attended to as part of 
peace negotiations, conflict may very well return. It is this delicate post conflict 
situation that we find emerging in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka.  
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Conflicts are presently one of the main impediments that restrict the 
emergence of development in many countries in Asia as well as Africa and Latin 
America (Ropers 2002).  While national level budgetary allocations and development 
priorities have been adjusted to cover the direct military costs of war, social facilities 
are being continuously destroyed by conflict.  The poor, in particular, are being 
increasingly excluded from national development in countries of the developing 
world. This perpetuates a situation in which a majority of the population becomes 
adversely affected, both economically and socially, by the conflict. If conflicts arise 
merely out of grievances is, of course, a debatable issue.  For some researchers it is 
the political and power dimensions generally known as greed, not merely grievances, 
that create and maintain a prolonged internal strife (Collier 2000). Therefore, as war 
can be of benefit to some individuals, such as unscrupulous traders and ambiguous 
politicians, these elements will also be the enemies of peace. 
 
Causes for conflicts can often be related to variations in socio-
economic development between individuals, ethnic communities and geographical 
locations. A systematic exclusion of certain sections of the population in less affluent 
countries can be related to the globalisation process (Hoogvelt 2001). External factors 
for conflicts are often closely interwoven into internal ones, such as: 
 
• Uneven regional structures, often as part of the colonial heritage, but also 
accentuated by post independence policies - as the present neo-liberal open 
economic policy. 
• Exclusion and marginalisation. Besides pure sociological dimensions to 
exclusions there can be broader socio-political factors such as absence of 
democratic rule from a wider point of view. It can also be the manner in which 
emerging elites use their position for personal benefit. 
• Cultural, religious, racial and ethnic variations. (Närman 2002) 
 
When such variations in development cannot be assessed quantitatively even the 
perception of discrimination can create fertile grounds for looming conflicts.  
 
Within this context the conflict that engulfed the island of Sri Lanka is 
quite a complex one. There are many debates and arguments over the definition and 
nature of the current conflict. Some people are comfortable with labelling this conflict 
as a ‘terrorist’ problem, while many others view it as an ‘ethnic’ problem. A part of 
the Tamil population may even regard it as a justified ‘war of liberation’. The 
understanding of root causes and implications of the war has in fact been quite 
complex, except if for some personal reason one chose to subscribe to any of the 
above viewpoints.   
 
A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA 
 
The current conflict in Sri Lanka dates back to late 1970s. Incidentally, the origin of 
the conflict coincided with the introduction of the neo-liberal open economic 
measures in 1977.  Recruitment to the armed forces on both sides of the divide, that 
is, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, has taken place primarily in the 
poorer southern and eastern regions of the country. From field studies carried out in 
Hambantota District in Sri Lanka it is obvious that the army has been the only 
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occupational alternative for many young boys from the poor families, while girls had 
other opportunities, such as the textile industries (Närman and Dangalle forthcoming). 
Similarly, most of the fighting cadres of the LTTE have been drawn from the poverty 
stricken eastern province of Sri Lanka.  Therefore it is sometimes seen as a war in 
which the poor and disadvantaged youths have been fighting a war of the rich - the 
agenda and the vested interests of the sponsors to be known at a future date.   
  
There have been attempts to estimate the macro economic implications 
of the Sri Lankan conflict.  For example, it was calculated that between 1984 and 
1996 the total cost of war could be in the range of about 170 percent of the 1996 GDP 
of the country (Kelegama 1998). Further, it was claimed that the war has reduced the 
economic growth rate by about 2 percent per annum (Central Bank 1999). In a study 
by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (2001) the economic costs of the war 
have been classified into the following categories:  
 
• Direct expenditures that include the direct expenses for the Government, as 
well as the LTTE. This includes war related equipment, arms and ammunitions 
and salaries of cadres etc. 
• Indirect Expenses that include costs of public security, which emerged as a 
main employment generation activity in the country where private firms that 
provide security guards have mushroomed in various parts of the country. In 
addition, rehabilitation costs of displaced persons also constitute a major 
expense in the recent years.  
• Cost for damages and reconstruction that covers cost of reconstruction, civil 
works and replacement of machinery destroyed by the war.  Some of the major 
items include roads, railways, passenger aircrafts, buildings and 
telecommunication equipment. 
• Loss of productive output that include economic activities discontinued such 
as agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and tourism together with losses to the 
productive labour force, which is internally displaced and out migrated.    
The total cost, direct and indirect, of the war up to 1998 has been estimated to be 
1.444 billion rupees (US$ 19bn.). These calculations, however, fail to capture the real 
nature of the damages of a prolonged conflict like the one in Sri Lanka.  At most, they 
reflect a partial estimate of the direct expenses of the war and secondary costs arising 
from human sufferings throughout these years. For instance, it may never be possible 
to account for the true cost of factors such as disability and the growing number of 
orphans or internal displacees that are caused by the war.   Over the years, many 
civilians have been internally displaced by the civil war, which has also resulted in 
rise of new local conflicts over meagre available resources.  One has also to account 
for the psychological trauma resulting from living under a constant threat of violence. 
A prolonged conflict can also penetrate into the whole family, leading to domestic 
violence and disruption of family structures. In many cases, the perception of poverty 
is directly related to a prolonged war. 
 
It is also important to mention the deeper political costs of conflicts that 
are difficult to express in monetary terms. The political capital is grossly eroded 
during the war and extended periods of emergencies. Human rights abuses, including 
torture, enlisting of children for combatant duties, arbitrary arrests and denial of 
accepted legal remedies will be expressions of the recurring violence. A culture of 
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violence tends to emerge in which the rule of the gun prevails (National Peace 
Council of Sri Lanka 2001).   
 
In Sri Lanka a great deal of attention has been given to the armed 
struggle between the Government and the LTTE in the eastern and northern parts of 
the country. Not enough attention has been paid to the violence in the southern 
districts of Galle, Matara, Kalutara, Hambantota, etc. in the early 1970s and late 
1980s by the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). This could be an even better example 
of war breaking out as a result of social and economic exclusion. Presently, JVP has 
been functioning as a political party with a significant support base in the southern 
district of Hambantota in particular (Narman and Dangalle forthcoming). It has been 
suggested that the kind of armed resistance that emerged in the southern parts could 
never have been of that magnitude if it had not happened parallel to the struggle in the 
North and East.  
 
Prior to the present phase of peace negotiations between the Sri Lankan 
Government and the LTTE, there had been a continuous escalation of violence, which 
covered the North, East, North Central, Western, and North Western provinces of the 
country.   This included operations and counter operations of the state forces, attacks 
and ambush operations by the LTTE and retaliatory attacks targeting civilians in war 
zones, border villages and also in the main cities including Colombo and Kandy.  
These violent events had resulted in the killing of about 60 to 70 thousand civilians 
and the collateral damages running into billions of US dollars (as seen above). In 
course of the on-going peace negotiations, the idea of a federal solution seems to meet 
with a lot of support as the possible future mode of governance. This may alleviate 
fears of separation and threats to territorial integrity as expressed in many quarters.  
 
Among the many thorny issues to be addressed in the current phase of 
the peace negotiations is the ‘Muslim’ factor, particularly in the eastern province. The 
demographic profile of the eastern province makes it interesting as it is critically 
balanced between Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese communities without any single 
group commanding a majority.   
 
As in many other civil wars in Third World countries, a key factor in 
the peace debate is ethnicity.  It would be easy to find ‘evidence’ showing this as 
being the crucial matter in the Sri Lankan case. Even if this is essential as observed by 
Korf and Silva (2003) there is a danger that it may conceal the multi-layered and 
complex reality. We may forget to give an analysis of poverty, underdevelopment, 
social exclusion and marginalisation in understanding the civil war in Sri Lanka. At 
the same time it is common to find members of one ethnic group often blaming 
another for the misfortunes encountered. There have been many claims from the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka of being discriminated against on issues such as land distribution 
in settlement schemes. It is thus easy to see how a struggle for resources is given an 
ethnic identity. The same is also relevant in debates over the actual distribution of 
entitlements among different groups. For example, the number of Tamil professionals 
has declined since independence. This, in turn, can be directly related to how the 
access to education has been distributed ethnically, especially the admission to 
universities (Peiris 2001). To some extent this kind of a situation arises in response to 
the colonial legacy, which tends to favour certain minority groups against the majority 
(Pandey 1990).   
 17
Anders Narman & Upali Vidanapathirana, Transiting from Prolonged Conflict to Post Conflict 
Development 
 
 
An important aspect of regional development dynamics of Sri Lanka is 
the high incidence of spatial poverty. For instance, the income gap between regions, 
as measured in terms of GDP per capita has shown clear symptoms of increasing 
disparities in the period between 1991 and 1995 (Gooneratne 2001). Similarly, the 
incidence of poverty, which was as low as 19 per cent for the district of Colombo was 
as high as 66 per cent in the Moneragala District.   Other districts in the periphery 
have not been spared of this pattern. The question then is how serious is the incidence 
of poverty in the regions of the North and the East for which no macro level data are 
available?    
 
Some studies have estimated that the number of the poor in the North 
and East range from 5,00,000 to 10,00,000 people, with the level of poverty ranging 
from 25 to 55 per cent, which is no worse than the other poor regions in Sri Lanka 
(National Planning Department 2000). Yet these estimates do not reflect the 
normative dimensions of poverty.  Simple income or expenditure data do not capture 
the human misery of the people living in the affected areas and even in the border 
villages. Poverty arising out of a serious breakdown of human conditions, such as loss 
of life, destruction of property, disintegration of family life, psychological trauma and 
disabilities caused by the conflict is much more devastating than simply poverty data.   
         
As data given are merely estimates it is difficult to give an accurate 
illustration of the regional structure in Sri Lanka in the last couple of decades. We 
have merely assumed that the conditions in these areas have been extremely difficult 
as people are living in a state of open war. Obviously a complete national 
development policy framework may have been held back due to the war. As noted 
above disadvantaged regions have been lagging behind even more as war hinders 
normal development activities in these areas. Moreover, the market driven economic 
activities supported under the neo-liberal economic policies have failed to percolate 
down to the hinterland let alone the North and East of the country. It is on that note 
that we will try to focus on Trincomalee district.  
  
 
TRINCOMALEE DISTRICT: A REPORT 
 
Trincomalee district is situated in the northernmost part of the eastern province of Sri 
Lanka (see map on p. 23). The district has a long sea front and about 2630 Sq. Kms. 
of fertile flat land. It is an area of great scenic beauty, which will be of tremendous 
value for tourism if the general conditions stabilise. Historically, it has been known as 
the `Sacred Hills of Three Temples’. In ancient times, early Tamil settlers built an 
enormous Hindu temple, which was later destroyed by Dutch colonialists in 1622. 
The complex ethno-religious character of Trincomalee is obvious as it is also a sacred 
place for Buddhists, with the remains of a monastery some 30 kms north of 
Trincomalee town. Because of the Bay with its unique deep water harbour It was a 
point of interest to early colonisers from Europe. The Portuguese, Dutch, French and 
British dominated it in succession from the 16th up to the 19th century.  During the 
World War II it was used as the British naval headquarters in the Pacific. At the same 
time it was the United States air base for attacks on the Japanese in Burma and 
Malaysia.  The unique deep-water harbour makes Trincomalee to be of great strategic 
concern even today.  
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Internally, the district’s strategic importance is its location between the 
two major arenas of heavy fighting between the Government army and the LTTE. To 
its north is the Mullaittivu district, one of the main strongholds of the Tamil guerrillas. 
To its south we find Batticoloa district that has provided most of the fighting cadres of 
the LTTE. To its west we find the two districts of Anuradhapura and Pollonnaruwa 
districts, which are mainly inhabited by Sinhalese population.  These two districts 
have provided a large number of fighting cadres to the Sri Lankan army. Trincomalee 
itself has a mixed ethnic composition that has made it a hotbed of the civil war during 
the past few decades.  For instance, in a number of planned attacks the army and the 
LTTE have massacred about eight hundred civilians belonging to the three 
communities between 1985 and 1999.  During late 1990s fighting for territory in 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa has been sporadic, but has a high level of terror. This has 
deepened the suspicion and mistrust between different ethnic groups of the population 
(Goodhand and Lewer 1999). It is significant that Trincomalee has been considered as 
an alternative site for a capital city in a free Eelam nation by LTTE. 
 
Trinclomalee District is divided into 11 administrative units, which are 
known as Divisional Secretary Divisions (DSD), with a total of 437 villages. The 
main city of Trincomalee is situated at the bay. Population figures on an area of civil 
war are generally controversial and politically sensitive. The last complete population 
census was taken in 1981, giving a total of 255,948 inhabitants. At that time the ethnic 
division among the major groups was thus: (i) Tamils 36 percent, (ii) Sinhalese 33 
percent, and (iii) Moors 29 percent. The steady increase of Sinhalese from merely 5 
percent in 1921 to 33 percent in 1981 is noteworthy (Brun 2003). Some parts of the 
district have been under direct LTTE rule. Consequently, a separate judiciary, police 
and tax system operated there. One dilemma for the future peace process is how to 
integrate the two distinct administrative modes in a united Sri Lanka.  
 
In 2001 a total of 192,902 inhabitants were included in the census, but 
the coverage was limited. Two of the DSDs - Muttur and Vergul/Echilampatti - were 
not included at all, while two others were partly covered. Based on complementary 
information the total population estimated in 2001 was 340,158. This would suggest 
an annual growth of 1.4 percent, which is slightly above the national average. The 
four DSDs, excluded fully or partially, were however all strong Tamil strongholds.  
 
One major problem in post conflict areas is the issue of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). It is estimated that some 800,000 persons have been 
displaced during the war in Sri Lanka. Trincomalee district has not only generated 
IDPs but has also received them from other conflict zones. An unconfirmed source 
estimates the total number of IDPs to be some 50 per cent of the total population of 
the district. According to UNHCR some 10,654 IDPs returned to Trincomalee, while 
2531 left the district in 2001 for their original homes elsewhere.  
 
One of the critical issues related to the war conditions is that people 
abandon their land. According to Peiris (2001) some 8000 ha of land had been left 
idle in the northeastern parts of the country. Among the most problematic areas was 
Trincomalee, with farmers leaving because of insecurity and displacement. This is an 
added dilemma to the increase in population density from 98 inhabitants per sq. kms. 
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in 1981 to 135 two decades later. Out of the total agricultural land some 85 percent 
was used for paddy cultivation in 2001 (Government of Sri Lanka 2002).  
 
According to the Minister-in-charge of Eastern Development, Rauff 
Hakeem, (Daily News 10 Aug 2002) there is a need to focus attention on local 
economic growth in areas under acute poverty, such as Trincomalee. He says that 
there is a need for some additional 20,000 acres for paddy cultivation. As the district 
is located in the dry zone expansion of agriculture is limited, even without the war. 
Two sectors suggested by the concerned minister, as possible contributors towards 
poverty alleviation, are milk production and fishing.  
 
There is no reliable data on wage employment in Trincomalee district, 
and we notice a fairly limited industrial sector. It appears that many small-scale 
industries deal with carpentry, garments and some food processing. Among large 
enterprises in the district are Prima Flour Milling Factory, Mineral Sands 
Cooperation, Sugar Factory and Mitsui Cement. To what extent a post conflict period 
would increase the demand for labour is an open question, as we have such limited 
information on the present situation. However, if a development process could be 
initiated the demand for professionals would be quite substantial. Since such persons 
may not be easily available in Trincomalee development assistance could be badly 
affected in the post conflict development.   
 
Another sector that could possibly benefit some local people is 
tourism. When conditions stabilise, this could be an important source of income, but it 
will be long before they can reap full benefit. A network of transportation and hotels 
has to be established and the area cleared from land mines. Further, the image of 
eastern Sri Lanka as a war zone has to be overcome. 
 
As noted above there is no proper quantitative assessment of poverty 
situation in Trincomalee. In a major poverty study of Sri Lanka conducted by the 
Asian Development Bank (2001) Trincomalee was selected to understand the 
perception of poverty in an area directly affected by civil war. The stress on people 
was so devastating that it affected almost all aspects of life. An important finding of 
the ADB Report was that poverty levels had increased considerably during the war. 
Trincomalee had been kept away from all kinds of national development programmes 
during the war. In addition, insecurity and restrictions on mobility had the severest of 
impact on the poor.  Psychological dimensions of the war, such as trauma, will 
constitute an even graver challenge for the future than the damage caused to the 
economy.  
 
The few attempts to assess the situation in quantitative terms are as 
follows. According to TamilNet (www.tamilnet.com), 90 percent of the population in 
Trincomalee depends on state support for mere survival. Further, 90 percent of the 
population has been displaced since 1983. It is also claimed that malnutrition is a 
serious problem, with 27 percent of the local population affected by it (national 
average being 10 percent). The official estimates for families eligible for samurdhi 
(welfare benefits) is 50 to 60 thousand families in 2001-02 (Government of Sri Lanka 
2002). According to an international NGO working on IDPs (www.idpproject.org) 
30-40 percent of the local children do not attend school. Poverty is said to be the main 
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reason for this. Other causes for low school attendance are multiple displacements, 
lack of schools and teachers, and other bureaucratic obstructions.  
 
WHAT NOW? 
 
On the difficult road towards the future Sri Lanka sees two major issues emerging – 
the flare up of new conflicts and the state of poverty in major parts of the country. The 
international donors and NGOs are willing to contribute towards the development of 
this nation if it is able to establish stability. While there have been some positive signs 
on the economic front this has not much benefited the poor.  
 
 What one finds now is a country that has just entered into the delicate 
process of peace negotiation and consolidation. This involves a major experience in 
social transformation in respect of peace and part development. If either of these two 
components is ignored there is a grave danger of failure, as the disadvantaged 
group(s) might go back to seeking a military solution to their predicament.  
 
While most would regard peace as a desirable objective it is not easy to 
achieve. There are gains to be made by ruthless profiteers from trade in small arms 
and light weapons. Besides, there are numerous demands from international donors 
and NGOs whose ulterior motives are not known and will rarely be known. And if the 
eastern province is given extra development attention, it may lead to regional 
competition and conflict within the country. Although development is best initiated 
from within, such initiatives are not easy to expect from a region badly affected by 
civil war for so many years and yet not free from ethnic tensions. 
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